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Cyber resilience has emerged as a new discipline to help organisations deal with cyber problems that 
cannot be addressed by traditional cyber security solutions. This study analysed the scattered 
literature on organisational aspects of cyber resilience using Linkov et al.'s (2013a) framework for 
cyber resilience. Three approaches were identified among the studies. This research found that limited 
investigation into organisational cyber resilience has been undertaken, while organisational aspects of 
cyber resilience have received less attention when compared to technical topics. The findings challenge 
the passive assumption of cyber resilience that appears to underlie many of the publications, which 
followed a cyber security approach. The limited work found, gaps in research subtopics and the 
underlying assumptions of organisational cyber-resilience, all point to research opportunities for 
researchers.  
Keywords (Organisational cyber resilience, research opportunities, cyber resilience publications, past 
trends) 
  
Australasian Conference on Information Systems                                  Bagheri & Ridley    
2017, Hobart, Australia  Organisational Cyber Resilience 
  2 
1 Introduction  
      The business activities of organisations largely rely on cyber activity, arising from advancements in 
information technology and telecommunication networks. Organisations’ needs for cyber 
infrastructure to meet information and commercial objectives have expanded dramatically over past 
decades (Tran et al. 2016). Cyber related issues create problems for organisations around the world for 
international trade, service efficiency and the marketing of commodities. The high cost of cyber-
attacks creates problems for organisations and their clients. As new forms of cyber-attacks evolve, both 
public and private organisations are targeted. A common purpose of cyber-attacks is to gain access to 
confidential information, because information is an important organisational asset that may endanger 
the organisation if disclosed (Tran et al. 2016). 
The scope of the present study is limited to cyber resilience instead of cyber security. While cyber 
security experts attempt to establish best practice standards and principles to improve cyber security, 
such guidelines are inadequate to address information security problems (Hult and Sivanesan 2014). 
Organisations need to adopt a resilience approach to cyber security, rather than merely implement 
cyber security controls (Christou 2016). The term resilience refers to the capacity of systems to cope 
with, adapt to, and recover from, disturbance (Lei et al. 2014). The concepts of cyber security and 
resilience differ. As cyber security consists of the procedures and measures taken to keep information, 
and computer systems, safe, it focuses on restricting data access to minimise information risk 
(Antikainen 2014). In contrast, cyber resilience is the capacity of a cyber-system to perform effectively 
regardless of hazards in the business environment. Many organisations realize that cyber security 
programs without cyber resilience cannot minimise their cyber dangers (Bindiya 2016; Bodeau and 
Graubart 2011). Cyber security seeks stability and to reduce disturbance, but in today’s complex 
environment there is no guarantee of organisational stability. Cyber resilience researchers argue 
instead that instability is a characteristic of cyber space (Chandler 2014; Kaufmann 2015).  
      The majority of the studies undertaken in the cyber resilience area consider technical aspects, while 
few studies investigate organisational aspects of cyber resilience. However, cyber resilience includes 
both technical and organisational elements (Nicholas 2016). Ten years of research demonstrate that 
major cyber incidents arise from human errors, rather than from technical problems (Stolfo et al. 
2008). Moreover, Arce (2003) reported the greatest risks to information systems stem from human 
beings, and not from technical problems. A lack of academic research that investigates organisational 
aspects of cyber resilience may lead to problems for the business environment, if companies are not 
aware of how organisational factors may influence their cyber resiliency.  
      This paper conducts a comprehensive review of the extant literature on organisational aspects of 
cyber resilience. It will integrate the information presented in the fragmented resources available, 
using a cyber resilience framework (Linkov et al. 2013a) to analyse the nature of publications in the 
area. Just 36 papers were found that specifically referred to organisational aspects of cyber resilience. 
The results of this investigation provide direction to future researchers on the current body of 
knowledge for organisational cyber resilience, its limitations, and opportunities for future research. 
      Section 2 explains the cyber resilience concept further, and the importance of organisational 
aspects of cyber resilience. Section 3 reviews previous studies on organisational aspects of cyber 
resilience. Section 4 discusses the Linkov et al. (2013a) framework, while Section 5 presents the 
methodology used to identify and analyse the literature for this study. Then Section 6 analyses the 
nature of past studies, using the Linkov et al. (2013a) framework, before presenting the results and 
discussion. Section 7 contains the study’s conclusions, limitations and contributions to research and 
practice, with suggestions for future research into organisational aspects of cyber resilience.  
2 Cyber Resilience in an Organisational Context 
      Cyber resilience has been regarded as one of the most important business objectives (Geers 2009). 
It contributes to improving the functionality of companies and societies worldwide (Ferdinand 2015).  
All organisational operations and information structures that rely on digital communication systems 
require the capability to withstand cyber crises (Bodeau and Graubart 2011). To protect the privacy of 
organisations’ information, cyber security experts impose policies and procedures to restrict data 
access and minimise risk, often following guidelines from external experts. However, cyber security 
relies on a passive system defence in comparison to cyber resilience (Chandler 2014; Kaufmann 2015). 
As cyber resilience focuses on the capacity of organisations to perform effectively regardless of 
business environment hazards, continuous communication between a disturbance and the reaction is 
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required (Chandler 2014). Therefore cyber resilience depends on an active response (Chandler 2014; 
Kaufmann 2015), and is different to cyber security. 
      Cyber resilience is seen as a system’s capability to “anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt” 
to changing environments and vulnerable situations (Bodeau and Graubart 2011).  In a second related 
view, some researchers see the purpose of cyber resilience is to assist organisations to operate in 
different conditions (Geers 2009). From this latter perspective, cyber resilience helps organisations to 
learn from adverse circumstances (Hult and Sivanesan 2014). However, a third view of cyber resilience 
argues that it is about returning to the original situation after disturbance (Williams and Manheke 
2010). The current study adopts the first and second views of cyber resilience as outlined above.       
      Increased attention has been paid to cyber resilience recently (Ferdinand 2015). While establishing 
cyber resilience procedures in an organisation is an essential aim of business communities, it is hard to 
accomplish (Ferdinand 2015). Cyber resilience needs to concentrate on organisational and cultural 
issues as much as technical issues (Nicholas 2016). However, the scholarly literature on organisational 
aspects of cyber resilience is both limited and not well organised (Ferdinand 2015).  There is no 
generally accepted and practical method for cyber resilience assessment in organisations. The limited 
literature and its lack of integration decreases opportunities for organisations to develop and 
implement cyber resilience (Ferdinand 2015), and for researchers to extend knowledge in the area.  
      Although there is no doubt that organisations need to acquire further knowledge in the technical 
aspects of cyber resilience, developing understanding of the organisational aspects is required. The 
organisational aspects of cyber resilience that are relevant to business operations are expected to cover 
a broader area than the technical aspects. Moreover, technical knowledge may be limited to specific 
aspects of a system, and not consider other important system layers, including the social, information 
and cognitive layers (Linkov et al. 2013b). The next section will review the existing literature on cyber 
resilience from an organisational context. 
3 Previous Studies on Organisational Cyber Resilience 
      This paper aims to identify the nature of past studies on organisational aspects of cyber resilience. 
As stated, many papers published in this new area considered only its technical aspects. As examples, 
both the Cyber Resilience Recovery Model (Tran et al. 2016) and the elements of cyber resilience 
identified by Thebeau II et al. (2014), proposed solutions to improve the technical aspects of cyber 
resilience. As the scope of this study is limited to organisational aspects of cyber resilience, this paper 
does not examine technical cyber resilience publications. A limited number of academic publications 
was noted, primarily derived from beginning research into organisational aspects of cyber resilience 
(Björck et al. 2015). Consequently, both academic and practitioner resources were investigated.  
There is an extensive literature on resilience, while the term has been used since the 1950s in the same 
way as in this study. As the term resilience has high recognition by researchers, and is used in a 
specific way in this investigation, the decision was made not to include the broader Information 
Systems or information security literature unless the search terms identified relevant studies. The 
following review discusses the current literature in the area.   
Interest in examining organisational aspects of cyber resilience began only recently. One of the first 
studies in the area was carried out by the World Economic Forum in 2012, which collated knowledge 
on cyber resilience. The World Economic Forum report (2012) contained recommendations for 
improving cyber resilience, including the need to consider stakeholders and the importance of 
management and leadership positions. Since 2012, additional recommendations for cyber resilience 
have emphasised the role of staff members (ANAO 2016), including through enhanced information 
sharing and the creation of learning environments (ASIC 2016; Bindiya 2016; Dalton et al. 2017; Davis 
2015; Davis et al. 2016; Ferdinand 2015; Hult and Sivanesan 2014; Putranti 2015), collaboration 
among staff members (ANAO 2016; ASIC 2016; Hult and Sivanesan 2014; Shapiro et al. 2016) and the 
significance of training programs (ANAO 2016; ASIC 2016; Dalton et al. 2017; Ferdinand 2015; Hult 
and Sivanesan 2014; Shapiro et al. 2016). 
      Other authors also studied the role of managers and leaders in promoting cyber resilience (ANAO 
2016; Dalton et al. 2017; Hult and Sivanesan 2014; Ingram and Martin 2017; Sarkar et al. 2013; 
Shapiro et al. 2016). All these authors suggested that where a senior manager or leader undervalued 
cyber resilience, other staff may take this viewpoint in the long-term. The thrust of many of these 
publications was that it is not appropriate to expect IT technical people to accept responsibility for 
cyber incidents. Leaders and managers must accept responsibility as well.  
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      Other management influences on cyber resilience identified in the literature included developing a 
security culture (CPMI 2014; North and Pascoe 2016), the need for recovery and response planning 
(ASIC 2015; ASIC 2016; Bindiya 2016; Bodeau and Graubart 2016a; Bodeau and Graubart 2016b; 
Dalton et al. 2017; Shapiro et al. 2016), and the contribution of cyber governance and monitoring 
programs (ASIC 2015; ASIC 2016; Davis 2015; Ferdinand 2015; North and Pascoe 2016). Another 
management role proposed to strengthen cyber resilience was the selection and application of 
appropriate rules in organisations to decrease cyber risks and increase cyber resilience  (Putranti 
2015). 
      Some studies emphasised cyber resilience operational issues in organisations, including defining 
asset management processes to access computer system records, networks, data and other information 
resources from inside or outside (ASIC 2015; ASIC 2016; Bodeau and Graubart 2016b; Dalton et al. 
2017; Davis et al. 2016; Ingram and Martin 2017). Other authors focused on risk assessment programs, 
as did the World Economic Forum (2012) and the CPMI (2014). Other research considered  assurance 
procedures, including testing programs (Joiner 2017) and use of the cyber exercise method (Hult and 
Sivanesan 2014; Shapiro et al. 2016). Publications also highlighted the importance of documenting all 
cyber resilience procedures and related issues (Ingram and Martin 2017; Shapiro et al. 2016). A further 
consideration proposed that may influence cyber resilience programs was to examine organisational 
communications with third parties (Putranti 2015; Shapiro et al. 2016). 
            From an examination of the literature, it appears that the studies followed three main 
approaches to consider cyber resilience in an organisational context:  
Approach 1: Studies that attempted to provide an evaluation tool to identify a level of cyber resilience 
in organisations. The World Economic Forum (2012) first proposed identifying the cyber resilience 
maturity level of organisations, an approach that was then followed by Ferdinand (2015) and the 
ANAO (2016).  
Approach 2: Studies that proposed other recommendations to improve organisational cyber resilience 
programs. They varied from suggesting good practices and principles ASIC 2016), to designing 
checklist programs. The World Economic Forum (2012), developed a c-suite checklist for 
organisational cyber resilience, an approach continued by Hult and Sivanesan (2014) and ASIC (2015).  
Approach 3: Studies that proposed organisational factors to contribute to cyber resilience, either 
structured into a matrix or not.  Some used a matrix to suggest cyber resilience metrics. One study 
proposed cyber resilience metrics based on different system layers (Linkov et al. 2013a) to develop an 
organisational cyber resilience matrix. While earlier authors had collated metrics for cyber resilience, 
they considered only the technical aspects (see Bodeau et al. 2012). Shapiro et al. (2016) refined the 
Linkov et al. (2013a) cyber resilience matrix for organisations, using system layers. Additional studies 
identified organisational factors that contribute to cyber resilience, but without using a structured 
matrix approach (Bindiya 2016; Christou 2016; CPMI-IOSCO 2015; Dalton et al. 2017; Davis et al. 
2016; Hiller and Russell 2015; Joiner 2017; Kaufmann 2015; North and Pascoe 2016). 
      The cyber resilience matrix to examine organisational cyber resilience, as introduced in Approach 3 
above (Linkov et al. 2013a), will be discussed next.  
4 Linkov et al.’s (2013) Framework  
      This section introduces Linkov et al.'s (2013a) cyber resilience matrix, a “4 X 4” framework that will 
be used later to analyse the organisational cyber resilience literature. Linkov et al. (2013a) used the 
operational domains defined by the Doctrine of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) for the vertical axis, 
claiming that cyber resilience functionality depends on system performance throughout all operational 
domains. The four domains of Linkov et al. (2013a)’s framework are: 
• Physical: Different physical assets of the organisation; 
• Information: Accurate information about the physical assets; 
• Cognitive: The decision-making process based on the physical and information layers, and 
• Social: Having communications for taking decisions (Linkov et al. 2013a). 
      Linkov et al. (2013b) also integrated the four stages of event management described by the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) into the horizontal axis of their framework: plan/prepare, absorb, recover 
and adapt. Each cell of the resilience matrix identifies the capacity of a system for cyber resilience at 
each NCW domain, and applies it to the decision-making processes listed by NAS. 
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      The cyber resilience matrix of Linkov et al. (2013a) was selected to analyse the nature of 
organisational cyber resilience publications for several reasons: 1) It integrates four domains of 
resilience with four stages of decision making. The design of the matrix reflects a definition of cyber 
resilience that incorporates the need to plan, absorb, recover, and adapt (Bodeau and Graubart 2011; 
Williams and Manheke 2010; World Economic Forum 2012). Choosing a framework that incorporates 
multiple organisational domains will enable a more detailed analysis of the studies, by attempting to 
identify their focus and processes. 2) Based on a definition of resilience that considers a system’s 
capacity to withstand disruption (Lei et al. 2014), it is relevant to evaluate whether past research 
considers actions to be performed after disruption, or only examines the avoidance and minimisation 
of disruptions. The cyber resilience matrix also considers system capability when disruptions happen 
in the Absorb/Recovery/Adapt phases. These features of the Linkov et al. (2013a) matrix provide this 
study an opportunity to assess which aspects of cyber resilience were considered in the previous 
studies. 3) Linkov et al. (2013a)’s cyber resilience matrix is the only academic cyber resilience 
framework identified to consider the information, cognitive and social domains of cyber resilience, 
rather than focusing only on the technical aspects. It is also the only cyber resilience matrix found that 
maps the domains to the NAS event management stages.  
      Neither of the two other academic frameworks published on organisational cyber resilience are 
suitable for this study. Ferdinand (2015) proposed different knowledge levels of cyber resilience in 
organisations. The Information Systems resilience conceptual model by Sarkar et al. (2013) 
concentrates on the external and internal elements that influence information system resilience in 
organisations. Neither framework appears to reflect the definition of resilience used in this current 
study regarding adapting to change. The following section discusses the methodology for this study.  
5 Methodology  
      The aim of this study is to investigate the conceptual nature of published research on organisational 
aspects of cyber resilience, by conducting a comprehensive review of its literature.  As explained, the 
cyber resilience matrix by Linkov et al. (2013) will be used for this task.  
      The methodology is illustrated in Figure 1. This study first identified both academic and 
practitioner publications on the topic, as academic papers appeared limited.  Publications were 
identified and collated from sources that included journal databases, books, theses, organisational, 
governmental, industry and technical reports, and research and professional websites. All non-
academic publications were considered as “practitioner”. The search terms were “cyber resilience”, 
“organisational cyber resilience”, “organisational resilience”, “cyber security resilience” and “cyber 
resilience in organisation”, and variants. The search to August 2017 was not limited by time period. 
Technical publications were excluded where they did not also discuss any organisational aspects. A 
summary was prepared of any organisational cyber resilience components mentioned. Papers were 
excluded where organisational components were not found in the screening procedure.  
The vertical domains of Linkov et al.'s (2013) cyber resilience matrix were used to categorise the 
identified publications into physical, information, cognitive and social domains (Table 6). Frequencies 
were recorded by domain for the publications, and whether academic or researcher-oriented. 
      The horizontal elements of the Linkov et al. (2013) matrix were used to categorise each identified 
publication into the plan/prepare, absorb, recover and adapt stages (Table 6). A record was made of 
publication frequencies in each category, and whether the papers were academic or researcher-
oriented.  
Two researchers coded the publications independently using the same framework. The inter-rater 
reliability was calculated using Krippendorff’s Coefficient.  The study’s results, and discussion, are 
presented in the next section.  
6 Results and Discussion 
      As can be seen in Table 1, 450 academic and practitioner publications were reviewed to identify 
those that considered organisational aspects of cyber resilience. Only 36 were found to be relevant. The 
remaining 414 publications focused on either technical aspects of cyber resilience, or organisational 
aspects of resilience, without considering the cyber domain. Many of the publications examined 
focused on cyber security issues, without discussion of the resilience aspects. Table 1 indicates that 
practitioners (55%) accounted for more of the publications on organisational cyber resilience than 
academics (44%). Rounding errors account for the discrepancy in the percentages.  
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Publications on organisational cyber resilience increased between 2012 and the end of July 2017 (see 
Table 2 and Table 3), after the first publication was noted in 2012. Percentages were used to enable 
easier comparison. Publications that were categorised into Linkov et al.’s (2013) physical, information, 
cognitive and social domains, and their plan/prepare, absorb, recovery and adapt stages, accounted for 
a small percentage of the 36 papers until 2014 (see Table 2 and 3).  In 2015 the percentage of relevant 
publications started to increase, most noticeably in the cognitive and social domains, and for the 
plan/prepare phase. The increased proportion of publications continued in 2016. The limited 
publications identified, their recency and the pattern of increase indicates that interest in the 
organisational aspects of cyber resilience is new and growing. 
 
 
Figure 1: The process used for analysis of past studies          
 
Total papers   Relevant papers        (Academic papers)  (Practitioner papers) 
450  36 16 [44%]       20 [55%] 
Table 1.  Total reviewed papers, and relevant publications categorised as academic or practitioner  
       
Domains 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  
(To August) 
Physical 0% 5% 8% 19% 25% 13% 















Table 2.  Percentage of total relevant papers for the domains by year  
Stages 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  
(To August) 
Plan/ prepare 2% 5% 8% 25% 27% 16% 















Table 3.  Percentage of total relevant papers for the stages by year  
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      A breakdown of analysis of the relevant publications by domain (Table 4) and stage (Table 5) using 
Linkov et al.'s (2013a) cyber resilience framework appears below for author category. When 
categorising the publications into the physical, information, cognitive and social domains (Table 4), a 
greater percentage of both author groups focused on cognitive issues of cyber resilience. Less attention 
was paid to issues in the information domain of organisational cyber resilience in comparison to the 
other domains. Note that many publications were categorised into more than one domain, or stage. 
 
Domains Academic studies Practitioner studies Total  studies 
Physical 22% 44% 66% 









Table 4.  Percentage of relevant academic and practitioner publications by framework domains  
 After categorising the relevant publications into the four event management stages from the 
framework (Table 5), the results show a higher percentage of the publications appeared in the 
plan/prepare stage (90%) when compared to the other three stages. Less attention was paid to the 
organisational capability to withstand after a disruption, that is, to each of the Absorb/Recovery/Adapt 
stages, for both academic and practitioner work. The adaptation stage received the least attention. 
 
Stages Total academic’s studies Total practitioner’s studies Total  studies 
Plan/ prepare 38% 52% 90% 









Table 5.  Percentage of relevant academic and practitioner publications by framework stages  
  
 Plan/ prepare for Absorb Recover from Adapt to 
Physical Practitioner:14  
Academic:9 
Total: 23 (64%) 
Practitioner:9 
Academic:1 

























Total: 25 (69%) 
Practitioner:11 
Academic:5 







Social Practitioner: 17 
Academic:10 
Total: 27 (75%) 
Practitioner:9 
Academic:3 







Table 6.  Publication frequencies, categorised by cell, using Linkov et al.'s (2013a) cyber resilience 
matrix (note that the same publication may appear in more than one cell). 
 The frequency of the 36 publications with an organisational cyber resilience focus, categorised into 
one or more of the cells of the Linkov et al.'s (2013a) matrix, and for each author group, appear in 
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Table 6.  It can be seen that the matrix cells appear at the intersection of the domains and event 
management stages. The percentages are of the 36 papers.  
From the analysis in Table 6, the cell at the intersection of the plan/prepare stage of the event 
management and the social domain, contained the highest number of publications with 27 (75%) of the 
total. The next highest was for the cell that intersects the plan/prepare stage and the cognitive domain, 
with 25 papers, or 69% of the total. The cells that intersected the plan/prepare stage and the physical 
domain, and the plan/prepare stage and the information domain, had the next highest publications, 
with 23 (64%) and 20 (55%) of the total number publications, respectively. The lowest number of 
publications categorised using the matrix came from the adapt stage, with eight (22%) from the social, 
seven (19%) from the cognitive and six (16%) from the information domains.  
      As explained, the results of categorising relevant past publications reveal that the major focus of the 
papers published in the area of organisational cyber resilience is on planning and preparing for social-
related activities. The findings reveal that the past publications focused least on the adaptation stage of 
cyber resilience, for the information domain.  
      These results suggest a range of implications for research into cyber resilience in organisations. 
First, while all 36 publications considered organisational cyber resilience, many appeared to 
incorporate a passive cyber security approach, rather than the active resilience approach. Cyber 
security scholars often focus on decreasing cyber threats, while cyber resilience necessitates a 
continuous communication between a disturbance and a reaction (Chandler 2014). The results of the 
analysis suggest that the identified publications placed most focus on the plan/prepare stage to 
minimise cyber risk, which is an approach suggestive of cyber security. This finding implies that many 
cyber resilience publications are underpinned by a passive interpretation of cyber resilience, instead of 
a more active meaning. Therefore, authors publishing in the area of cyber resilience are urged to reflect 
on, and clarify their understanding of cyber resilience, and differentiate between cyber security and 
cyber resilience. Research that adopts the active concept of cyber resilience, and investigates how 
organisations absorb, recover from, and in particular adapt to, cyber threat, will be best placed to 
contribute to the future body of knowledge in this area.   
      Overall interest in the organisational aspects of cyber resilience increased during the five years 
since 2012. However, while focus on the physical areas of organisational cyber resilience grew, 
attention to social and behavioural issues declined. This finding suggests that an increased proportion 
of those who became interested in organisational cyber resilience in very recent years preferred t0 seek 
solutions from the physical domain. Opportunities also exist for researchers to address cyber threat 
problems by positioning their work in the information, cognitive and social perspectives.    
      The final adaptation stage of the four event management stages of the framework had the smallest 
number of publications for all five years. Adaptation received the least attention among academics. 
Adaptation and adjustment to external threats are fundamental to resilience, and require a system to 
have the capacity to adjust to a new situation (Berkes et al. 2008). There is a perspective on resilience 
that seeks a system to return to its original state after a shock, without the need to adapt to a new 
position (Grimm and Wissel 1997; Holling 1996). However maintaining stability in cyber systems will 
not enable organisations to address new and changing cyber threats. Opportunities exist for academic 
researchers to investigate how organisations may adapt to become cyber resilient. It is possible that 
once organisations learn to adapt to a cyber threat, they will become better able to adapt to different 
cyber threats in the future. Research into ways for organisations to adapt to build cyber resilience will 
also contribute to practice by offering guidance arising from academic research. Specifically, 
researchers are encouraged to consider organisational adaption for cyber resilience in the information 
domain, a neglected area of study.      
7 Conclusion  
This paper analysed the nature of past publications on organisational cyber resilience. It presented 
a literature review of this new field, in an area that has caught the interest of media, governments and 
business in current times.  This study integrated information presented in the fragmented resources 
available, and appears to be the first investigation to review the literature in the area. A framework by 
Linkov et al. (2013a) was used to analyse the nature of both academic and practitioner publications on 
organisational cyber resilience. The publications were analysed using the four framework domains, 
physical, information, cognitive and social, and the management stages of plan/prepare, absorb, 
recover from, and react to.  
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    While the number of publications used was limited, the specificity of the terms used by researchers 
in this area enabled the search to be comprehensive, within the study’s scope. The results of this study 
have implications for both academics and practitioners by pointing to opportunities and needs for 
organisational cyber resilience research, from the results of analysis. This study also comments on 
some recent attempts to investigate organisational cyber resilience, by pointing to inconsistencies in 
the underlying assumptions of some of that work.  
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